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1 INTRODUCTION
Nash equilibrium is one of the cornerstones of modern economic theory, with substantive
application in all major elds in economics, particularly industrial organization. It is the
benchmark theoretical model for analyzing strategic interactions among a handful of players.
Given the importance of gaming in economic theory, the empirical analysis of games has been
the focus of a recent literature in econometrics and industrial organization, such as Tamer
(2003), Berry & Tamer(2007), Aguirregabiria & Mira (2007), Aradillas-Lopez (2007, 2008),
Ciliberto & Tamer (2009), Bajari, Hong, Krainer & Nekipelov (2010) and Bajari, Hong &
Ryan (2010) (hereafter BHR).
Econometrically, a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model,
such as the conditional logit or multinomial probit. An agents utility is often assumed to
be a linear function of covariates and a random preference shock. However, unlike a dis-
crete choice model, utility is also allowed to depend on the actions of other agents. Such
modeling strategy was rst suggested by the seminal work of Bresnahan & Reiss (1990,
1991). Although there are numerous studies on both methodology and empirical applica-
tions of game-theoretic models, the most widely studies is the class of incomplete infor-
mation simultaneous-move games (normal form) and dynamic games, see Tamer (2003),
Bajari, Hong, Krainer & Nekipelov (2010) and Aguirregabiria & Mira (2007). The com-
plete information games received fewer studies due to its computational complexity, since
it involves multidimensional integrals. More recently, Ciliberto & Tamer (2009) and BHR
(2010) provide simulation-based estimators for static complete information discrete games.
Furthermore, estimation of sequential-move (extensive form) games has been quite limited,
especially on itsgeneral form, Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2002) and Schmidt-Dengler (2006) es-
timate some simplied sequential-move games with special game structure. The estimation
of the general class of sequential move games has su¤ered from its computational compli-
cations, Maruyama (2009) provides a simulation-based estimator for the general class of
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discrete-choice perfect information sequential move games with a modied version of the
GHK simulator (Geweke (1989, 1991), Hajivassiliou & McFadden (1998) and Keane (1990,
1994)), which he called as "sequential GHK". The estimator provided by Maruyama (2009)
essentially is a maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) estimator, As is well known, MSL is
biased for any xed number of simulations, in order to obtain
p
T consistent estimators, one
needs to increase the number of draws S so that Sp
T
!1. Wang & Graham (2009) provides
a generalized maximum entropy (GME) estimator for this class of games which avoids the
usual multidimensional integrals by using the data constraints instead of the moment con-
straints, they reformulate the estimation problem as a mixed-integer nonlinear optimization
problem since there are logical connections between endogenous variables among the equi-
librium conditions, although the computational burden is acceptable for most applications,
it is hard to construct large sample properties for this GME estimators, since essentially it
is a nonsmooth estimation.
In this paper, we propose a simulation based estimator for discrete sequential move games
of perfect information which relies on the simulated moments and importance sampling. The
moment conditions implied by the model equilibrium conditions in discrete sequential move
games of perfect information contain multidimensional integrals, in principle, one can use
straightforward monte carlo simulations to get unbiased estimators for such multidimen-
sional integrals, but there are several problems that can arise with estimators based on such
simulations. First, there are discrete parts of the model, the MSM objective function is
typically discontinuous in the parameter vector, making it hard to minimize correctly; Sec-
ond, the straightforward monte carlo simulations need to solve the game numerous times,
typically once for every draw, for every observation, for every parameter vector that is ever
evaluated in an optimization procedure. If we have T observations, performs NS simula-
tion draws, and optimization requires R function evaluations, estimation requires solving the
model NS  T  R times, this can be computationally time consuming. In spirit of Acker-
berg (2009) and BHR (2010), we make use of importance sampling to overcome both of the
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problems. In order to make use of importance sampling, it is important to make sure that
the tails of the importance density are not too thin in a neighborhood of the parameter that
minimizes the objective function in the estimation procedure, the GME estimator proposed
by Wang & Graham (2009) can be used to construct the importance density, or one can
make use of the MSL estimator proposed by Maruyama (2009). As noted by Maruyama
(2009), the estimation of sequential games has some distinctive features and advantages over
simultaneous games, the most advantage is that perfect information sequential games can
utilize the notion of subgame perfection, which guarantees the existence of unique equilibria,
however, in simultaneous games of complete information, the existence of multiple equilib-
ria is sometimes considered problematic or at least an issue to deal with (see for example,
Ciliberto & Tamer, 2007; BHR, 2010).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the general discrete sequential-
move games to be estimated and formulate its equilibrium conditions, the assumptions for
the identication and estimation also are presented. Section 3 formalizes our simulation
and estimation approach. Monte carlo simulations are conducted in section 4. Section 5
concludes, and provides limitations and future work.
2 THE MODEL
In the model, there are T independent repetitions of a sequential move game of perfect
information (extensive form game). In each game there are i = 1; :::; Nt players, each with
the nite set of actions Ait. Dene At = iAit and let at = (a1t; :::; ait; :::aNt) denote a generic
element of At. Without loss of generality, the order of subscripts for players (1; :::; Nt) also
represents the decision order of the sequential move game in each repetition, that means
player 1 makes decision rst and player Nt at the end. Player is von Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) utility is a map uit : At ! R, where R is the real line. Since we study the sequential
move game, the corresponding equilibrium concept is the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE),
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this can be achieved when every player expects no gain from individually deviating from
its equilibrium strategy in its every subgame, the standard technique for solving the SPE
is backward induction, furthermore, the nite sequential move game of perfect information
where there is no player is indi¤erence between any two outcomes has a unique SPE. We
will sometimes drop the subscript t for simplicity when no ambiguity would arise.
Following Bresnahan & Reiss (1990, 1991), assume that the vNM utility of player i can
be written as:
ui(a; x; i; ) = i(x; a; ) + i(a) (1)
In Equation (1), player is vNM utility from action a is the sum of two terms. The rst
term i(x; a; ) is a function which depends on a, the vector of actions taken by all of the
players, covariates x, the playerscharacteristics and some other variables which inuence
the utility, and parameters , covariates x are observed to the econometrician. The second
term is i(a), a random preference shock which reects the information about utility that is
common knowledge to the players but not observed by the econometrician. Unlike Maruyama
(2009), here the preference shocks depend on the entire vector of actions a, not just the
actions taken by player i. As argued by BHR (2010), this is a more general setting and
seems straightforward within the game framework, think about a simple entry game, the
unobserved information of one player to econometrician may be di¤erent not only among
players but also action vector dependent. i(a) are assumed to be independent or some
known dependence, let i denote the vector of the individual i(a) and i denote the vector
of all the shocks. we will discuss more about the structure of i in the identication and
estimation section.
As noted above, the equilibrium concept corresponding to the sequential move game of
perfect information, SPE, is a equilibrium strategy prole which means that every player
expects no gain from individually deviating from its equilibrium in every subgame. A strategy
of player i 2 N is a function that assigns an action in Ai to each nonterminal history,
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a players deviation form equilibrium holding others decisions xed does not mean that
all the others make the same decision, it means the others follow the same strategy. But
what can be observed is only the equilibrium actions (i.e. equilibrium outcome). Thus, for
deriving the equilibrium conditions in our econometric model, we should make the others
action prole when one player deviating as endogenous variable. Formally, an SPE action
prole, aSPE = (aSPE1 ; :::a
SPE
i ; :::a
SPE
N ), is any solution for the decisions of the players that
satises:
ui(a
SPE
i ; a
SPE
 i ; x; i; )  ui(ai; aSPE<i ; a>i(aSPE<i ; ai); x; i; )  0 (2)
for all i = 1; :::; N and all ai 6= aSPEi .
where a>i(a
SPE
<i ; ai) is a SPE action prole for the subgame that starts from player i + 1
given the decisions of the preceding players, ai. This equilibrium conditions are dened re-
cursively and the solution can be easily calculated by the backward induction for any given
parameters , observed covariates, x, and unobservable shocks . Kuhns theorem ensures
the existence of solutions of the inequality system (2) but makes no claim of uniqueness, thus
we can conclude that every nite sequential move game of perfect information has a SPE.
As noted by Berry & Tamer(2007), dealing with multiple equilibria complicate the identi-
cation problem, fortunately, a modied version of Kuhns theorem ensures the uniqueness
of equilibria of nite sequential move games of perfect information, which is presented in
theorem 1.
Theorem 1 Every nite sequential move game with perfect information in which no player
is indi¤erence between any two outcomes has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. See Osborne & Rubinstein (1994).
Obviously, the indi¤erence case can be ignored in our econometric model since we work
with continuous latent payo¤s (i(a) has an atomless distribution). Given such structure
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of the discrete choice sequential move game, our task is to estimate and draw an inference
about the parameters of payo¤ functions, , with the observation of action prole ao, some
covariates which have e¤ect on the payo¤s, x, and an exogenous decision order. Note that
the actual payo¤ levels are unobserved, since in most case, we can not determine what they
should be, i.e. they are the latent variables. Before presenting our estimation strategy, some
assumptions about the model structure are introduced.
2.1 Assumptions
Assumption 1 (Exogenous Decision Order) The decision order of agents in the se-
quential move game is exogenous.
Although the exact decision order of agents is rarely observed, we can estimate sequential
move games by imposing di¤erent decision order assumptions, this restriction only excludes
the endogenous decision order which may alter the uniqueness of the game structure.
Assumption 2 (Scale and Location Normalizations) The payo¤ of one action for
each player are xed at a known constant.
As argued by BHR (2010), this restriction is similar to the argument that we can normal-
ize the mean utility from the outside good equal to a constant, usually zero, in a standard
discrete choice model. One clearly nd that from the equilibrium condition (2) that adding
a constant to all deterministic payo¤s does not perturb the set of equilibria, so a location
normalization is necessary. A scale normalization is also necessary, as multiplying all deter-
ministic payo¤s by a positive constant does not alter the SPE. This restriction is subsumed
in the following assumption about the distribution of the error terms.
Assumption 3 (Regularity Conditions of Random Shocks) The joint distribution of
 = (i(a)), G(j) is independent and known to all agents and the econometrician.
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This restriction allows G to be any known joint parametric distribution, identication
in this game with unknown G is complicated, and since our estimation is based on the
simulation which relies on the distribution of error terms, the case with unknown G will not
be dealt with here.
3 ESTIMATION
Next, we propose computationally e¢ cient simulation based estimators for  and , the
parameters governing agentsdeterministic payo¤s and the error termsdistribution, given
the observations of a sequence (at; xt) of action proles and covariates. To form the estimation
framework, enumerate the elements of A from k = f1; :::;#Ag. Denote the observation at
tth repetition of the game with yt and
yt =
266666666664
I(at = 1)
:
I(at = k)
:
I(at = #A)
377777777775
= f(xt; t; 0) (3)
where I() is the usual indicator function, f(xt; t; ) is an algorithm which solves the game
for any given xt, t and , obviously, it is corresponding to the model equilibrium conditions
(2). Denote the probability that a specic action prole k is played implied by the model as
P (kjxt; ) and collect them into a vector P (ajxt; ), where
P (ajxt; ; ) = E[f(xt; t; )jxt] =
Z
f(xt; t; )dG(; ) (4)
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At the true parameters of the data-generating process the predicted probability of each action
equals its empirical probability of each action k:
E[(yt   P (ajxt; ; ))jxt] = 0 at  = 0;  = 0 (5)
Note that, because the probability of all of the elements of must sum to one, one of these prob-
abilities will be linearly dependent on the others, so there are e¤ectively #A  1 conditional
moment restrictions. Obviously, the expectation of any function w(xt) of the conditioning
variables multiplied by the di¤erence between yt and the predicted probabilities is identically
zero at the true parameters, i.e.
E[w(xt)  (yt   P (ajxt; ; ))] = 0 at  = 0;  = 0 (6)
In principle, the value of  and , say ^ and ^, that set the sample analog of this moment
GT (; ) =
1
T
X
t
[w(xt)  (yt   P (ajxt; ; ))]
equal to zero or as close as possible to zero is a consistent estimator of 0 and 0. Under ap-
propriate regularity conditions, one obtains asymptotic normality of the estimators (Hansen,
1982), and as the number of moments used increases, one can approach asymptotic e¢ ciency
by the right choice of instruments (i.e. the w function).
To make use of such GMM estimation, we should overcome some obstacles, the rst
obstacle is that the predicted probabilities P (ajxt; ; ) which dened by (4) is not easily
computable, since it involves a multidimensional integral, thus simulation enters the picture.
As can be found below, a straightforward Monte Carlo procedure is not practical due to the
computational burden and discreteness in f(xt; t; ), we make use of importance sampling
to overcome such problems.
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3.1 Simulation
The straightforward way of simulating
P (ajxt; ; ) = E[f(xt; t; )jxt] =
Z
f(xt; t; )dG(; )
is by averaging f(xt; t; ) over a set of NS random draws (1; :::; NS) from the distribution
of t, G(j), i.e.
~P (ajxt; ; ) = 1
NS
X
ns
f(xt; t; ) (7)
~P (ajxt; ; ) is trivially an unbiased simulator of the true expectation P (ajxt; ; ) =
E[f(xt; t; )jxt]. McFadden (1989) and Pakes & Pollard (1989) prove statistical properties
of the MSM estimator that set the simulated moment:
~GT (; ) =
1
T
X
t
[w(xt)  (yt   ~P (ajxt; ; ))]
=
1
T
X
t
[w(xt)  (yt   1
NS
X
ns
f(xt; t; ))] (8)
as close as possible to zero. The most important of these statistical properties is the fact
that these estimators are typically consistent for nite NS. The intuition behind this is
that simulation error averages out over observations as T ! 1. This consistency property
gives the estimator an advantage over alternative estimation approaches such as maximum
simulated likelihood (MSL), which typically is not consistent for a nite number of simulation
draws. Another nice property of these estimators is that the extra variance imparted on the
estimates due to the simulation is relatively small, asymptotically it is 1=NS. As noted
above, an important obstacle of making use of MSM estimation procedure in our sequential
game estimation is that f(xt; t; ) typically is not continuous in , since the algorithm for
solving the discrete sequential move game of perfect information essentially is a combination
of several indicator functions, which is not continuous in . The discreteness in f(xt; t; ) will
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generate the discreteness in ~P (ajxt; ; ), as can be found via a simple entry game conducted
in example 1. Thus the simulated moments, ~GT (; ), will tend not to be continuous in
, typically having both ats and jumps. This can be very problematic in the numeric
minimization of ~GT (; ), derivative based methods are useless.
Example 1 To illustrate the discreteness problem, consider a simple two-rm sequential
entry game, where rm 1 moves rst. Each rm has the following prot function:
ui(x; a; i; ) = 1(ai = 1)fxi1 +N(a)2 + i(a)g
where ai 2 f0; 1g is rm is action, N(a) is the number of entrants for a action prole a.
Function f maps (x; ; ) into the market structure (outcome) y,
y =
266664
I(0; 0)
I(0; 1)
I(1; 0)
I(1; 1)
377775 = f(x; ; )
For exposition we focus on the 2nd element of y, we can write this out explicitly as:
y2 = I(0; 1) = I
0BBBBBB@
[0 > x11 + 2 + 1(1; 0) \ 0 > x21 + 22 + 2(1; 1)]
[
[0 > x11 + 22 + 1(1; 1) \ 0  x21 + 22 + 2(1; 1)]
\
x21 + 2 + 2(0; 1)  0
1CCCCCCA
Obviously, function f is not continuos in . The straightforward simulator
~P ((0; 1)jxt; ; ) = 1
NS
X
ns
I
0BBBBBB@
[0 > x11 + 2 + 1;ns(1; 0) \ 0 > x21 + 22 + 2;ns(1; 1)]
[
[0 > x11 + 22 + 1;ns(1; 1) \ 0  x21 + 22 + 2;ns(1; 1)]
\
x21 + 2 + 2;ns(0; 1)  0
1CCCCCCA
is also not continuos in .
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In spirit of Ackerberg (2009) and BHR (2010), we make use of importance sampling
to reduce the non-smoothness problem1. Importance sampling is most noted for its ability
to reduce simulation error and computational burden, and was rst used in game-theoretic
models estimation by BHR (2010), who estimated norm form complete information games.
First, we change the variable of integration in Equation (4) from  to u. Let h(ujx; ; )
denote the density of u, conditional on x,  and , and g(i(a)j) the density of i(a). Then
the density h(ujx; ; ) is:
h(ujx; ; ) =
Y
i
Y
a2A
g(ui(a; x; i; )  i(x; a; )j) (9)
If we change the variable of integration in
P (ajxt; ; ) = E[f(xt; t; )jxt] =
Z
f(xt; t; )dG(; )
=
Z
f(xt; t; )g(j)d
from  to u, then P (ajxt; ; ) becomes:
P (ajxt; ; ) =
Z
f(u)h(ujxt; ; )du (10)
In order to use importance sampling, introduce the importance density q(u), rewrite Equation
(10) as:
P (ajxt; ; ) =
Z
f(u)
h(ujxt; ; )
q(u)
q(u)du (11)
We can then simulate P (ajxt; ; ) by draw random variables u1; :::uNS from q(u) and
construct
P^ (ajxt; ; ) = 1
NS
NSX
ns=1
f(uns)
h(unsjxt; ; )
q(uns)
(12)
1McFadden (1989) noted the ability to use importance sampling to smooth simulations which is extended
by Ackerberg (2009).
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Note that
E[P^ (ajxt; ; )] = E[f(u)h(ujxt; ; )
q(u)
]
=
Z
f(u)
h(ujxt; ; )
q(u)
q(u)du
= E[f(xt; t; )jxt]
 P (ajxt; ; )
So the importance sampling simulator P^ (ajxt; ; ) is an unbiased simulator for the true
expectation. The most important property of this simulator is that P^ (ajxt; ; ) will generally
be continuous in  and  since it only depends on  and  through h(ujxt; ; ) which is
continuous in  and  given that g(j) is continuous, this can be revealed by using this
simulator in the simple two-player entry game which conducted in Example 1.
Example 2 (Ex.1 Cont) Consider the two-player entry game conducted in Example 1.
For exposition we also only focus on the 2nd element of y:
y2 = I(0; 1) = I
0BBBBBB@
[0 > x11 + 2 + 1(1; 0) \ 0 > x21 + 22 + 2(1; 1)]
[
[0 > x11 + 22 + 1(1; 1) \ 0  x21 + 22 + 2(1; 1)]
\
x21 + 2 + 2(0; 1)  0
1CCCCCCA
A change of variables from  to u resulting in
P^ ((0; 1)jxt; ; ) = 1
NS
X
ns
I
0BBBBBB@
[0 > u1;ns(1; 0) \ 0 > u2;ns(1; 1)]
[
[0 > u1;ns(1; 1) \ 0  u2;ns(1; 1)]
\
u2;ns(0; 1)  0
1CCCCCCAh(unsjxt; ; )
q(uns)
obviously, given that g(j) is continuous, this simulator is smooth in the underlying para-
meters.
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Although the theory of importance sampling proves that P^ (ajxt; ; ) is a smooth and
unbiased simulator for any choice of the importance density q(u) which has su¢ ciently large
support. However, as noted by BHR(2010), as a practical matter, it is important to make
sure that the tails of the importance density q(u) are not too thin in a neighborhood of the
parameter that minimizes the objective function in our estimator. One natural choice of
q(u) is h(ujx;;) where  and  are some guess or preliminary estimate of  and . To
ensure that the importance density q(u) are not too thin in a neighborhood of the estimated
parameters, we found that the generalized maximum entropy (GME) estimator proposed by
Wang & Graham (2009) is a good choice for and, also we can set the importance density
equals to the distribution of utilities conditional on x in the GME estimation, this means
that for each value of x we simulate the GME estimation NS times. At the same time, since
P^ (ajxt; ; ) only depends on  and  through h(ujxt; ; ) which is continuous in  and 
given that g(j) is continuous, in computations, the f(uns) and q(uns) should be stored as
they do not vary as the underlying parameters changes in the estimation procedure, then as
the underlying parameters changes, one only need re-compute the density h(ujx; ; ).
3.2 The Estimator
Given the importance simulator P^ (ajxt; ; ), we can replace the moment conditions in Equa-
tion (6) by its simulation analog:
G^T (; ) =
1
T
X
t
[w(xt)  (yt   P^ (ajxt; ; ))]
Then for a positive denite weighting matrix WT , the MSM estimator is:
(^MSM ; ^MSM) = arg minf;g
G^T (; )
0
WT G^T (; ) (13)
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The asymptotic theory for estimating discrete choice models using MSM is well developed
by McFadden (1989) and Pakes & Pollard (1989). Christian Gouriéoux & Alain Monfort
(2002) has done a formal analysis of the MSM estimation in the GMM framework, involved
the optimal choice of the weighting matrix WT and instrumental matrix w(xt). However,
this MSM estimator which relies on the conditional moment restrictions (5), just as the
GMM, can render inconsistent estimates since the number of arbitrarily chosen instruments
is nite. In fact, consistency of the GMM estimators relies on additional assumptions that
imply unclear restrictions on the data generating process. To avoid such inconsistent case,
we can make use of the consistent estimation of models dened by conditional moment
restrictions proposed by Dominguez & Lobato (2004), but use the simulation analog instead
of the usual sample analog. The always consistent estimator can be dened as:
(^AC ; ^AC) = arg minf;g
1
T 3
TX
l=1
24 TX
t=1
m^(yt; xt)I(xt  xl)
!0  
TX
t=1
m^(yt; xt)I(xt  xl)
!35
(14)
where
m^(yt; xt) = yt   P^ (ajxt; ; ) (15)
This estimator is always consistent but ine¢ cient since it does not control the minimization of
the covariance, Dominguez & Lobato (2004) briey discussed that by carrying out a single
Newton-Raphson step in the direction of the e¢ cient GMM estimator, an asymptotically
e¢ cient estimator can be constructed. Another choice of the e¢ cient estimation is Kitamura,
Tripathi & Ahn (2004)s local estimation, but it need to introduce a bandwidth number,
although this bandwidth number allows the estimator to be root-n asymptotically normal
and e¢ cient, statistical inference with this estimator can be sensitive to the selection of the
bandwidth number.
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4 MONTE CARLO
To demonstrate the performance of our estimator in nite samples, we conducted a simple
Monte Carlo experiment using the simple sequential entry game introduced in Example 1.
There are two players and each player has the following prot function:
ui(x; a; i; ) = 1(ai = 1)f1xi1 + 2xi2   3xi3 + i(a)g (16)
where player 1 moves rst. We assume that x11  N(20; 1), x12  N(11; 3); x21 
N(26; 1); x22  N(11; 3) and xi3 = N(a), where N(a) is the number of entrants for a action
prole a, and it(a), the idiosyncratic error term, are drawn from standard normal distrib-
ution. As discussed previously, our model requires both scale and location normalizations,
so we assume the variance of the error terms is one and the payo¤s of not entering are zero.
Thus our game has three unknown parameters: 1; 2 and 3. We generated 1000 samples
of size T = 25; 50; 100; 200 and 400 to assess the nite sample properties of our estimator,
rst use importance simulator (12) get P^ (ajxt; ; ) for each t then generate the simulated
analog (15). The true parameter vector was chosen as 1 = 1, 2 =  1 and 3 =  8.
In Table I we report the mean, median, standard deviation, mean bias, median bias
and mean square error (MSE) for our estimator for ve sample sizes, T = 25; 50; 100; 200
and 400, which show that our estimator can perform well in moderately-sized samples, the
payo¤ parameters are estimated near their true values, and as the sample size increase, the
estimates become more precisely. One may nd that parameters are estimated much less
precision when sample size is 400, this may due to the large scale non-linear algorithm weve
chosen. Actually, since the objective function of our estimate is not globally concave, we
choose the global optimization algorithm "lgo" in GAMS, a more meticulous modication
on the algorithm details should increase the performance of our estimation in large samples.
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Table I: Monte Carlo Results for Normal Shocks
Standard Mean Median
Parameter Mean Median Deviation Bias Bias MSE
T = 25
1 1:0409 1:0325 0:1296 0:0409 0:0325 0:0184
2  1:0618  1:0385 0:2671  0:0618  0:0385 0:0751
3  8:1269  8:7044 0:8386  0:1269  0:7044 0:7186
T = 50
1 1:0328 1:0270 0:1299 0:0328 0:0270 0:0179
2  1:0496  1:0220 0:2027  0:0496  0:0220 0:0435
3  8:1054  8:1655 0:8017  0:1054  0:1655 0:6532
T = 100
1 1:0109 1:0157 0:0663 0:0109 0:0157 0:0045
2  1:0050  1:0027 0:0907  0:0050  0:0027 0:0082
3  8:1199  8:1546 0:6529  0:1199  0:1546 0:4402
T = 200
1 1:0038 1:0137 0:0666 0:0038 0:0137 0:0044
2  1:0010  1:0027 0:0805  0:0010  0:0027 0:0065
3  8:0401  8:0788 0:6129  0:0401  0:0788 0:3770
T = 400
1 1:0103 1:0164 0:0655 0:0103 0:0164 0:0043
2  1:0096  1:0089 0:0750  0:0096  0:0089 0:0057
3  8:0817  8:1049 0:5677  0:0817  0:1049 0:3287
True value: 1 = 1, 2 =  1; 3 =  8; Monte Carlo Times: 1000
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5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed the simulation based estimation for the discrete sequential move
game of perfect information, which relies on the simulated moments and importance sam-
pling. We use importance sampling techniques not only to reduce computational burden
and simulation error, but also to overcome non-smoothness problems. Monte Carlo evidence
demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately-sized samples. The most
limitation of our estimation is that it relies on the known distribution of random preference
shocks which is rarely known to researchers, working with the unknown G(j) is an impor-
tant topic for future research. Another interesting issue concerns the e¢ cient estimation of
the simulated conditional moments, although in a full parametric model, we can make use of
the rst order condition of the likelihood function, the simulated score may not exist since
the simulated choice probability can be zero in some random draws.
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